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What is the impact on human capital investment when a worker’s ability
and investments are observed by the labour market only when the worker
invests in self-promoting activities? When …rms pay spot market wages,
high ability workers overinvest in self- promotion. There is no employment
contract that attains full e¢ciency. Constrained e¢ciency is attained when
employment bonds are feasible. The contract that both attains constrained
e¢ciency and minimizes the bond posted o¤ers (i) severance payments, (ii)
strategically matching outside o¤ers and (iii) a minimum wage.
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Workers who acquire certain skills on the job make themselves more valuable to
their employers, and also more attractive to other …rms. Alternative employers
who recognize the workers’ enhanced expertise may try to bid them away by
o¤ering them wage increases. The possibility of workers’ investments in certain
kinds of human capital leading to such alternative o¤ers generates tension for a
…rm. On the one hand, an employer would like its employees to acquire skills
that enhance the employees’ performance on the job, but on the other hand, it
would prefer that other employers not observe these skills. When other employers
observe certain kinds of skills and not others, workers have a tendency to over-
invest in the skills that might be observed relative to those that are not observed.
The objective of this paper is to understand the employment relationship that
develops under such circumstances.
Since investment decisions of workers are distorted when self-promoting ac-
tivities are available, we investigate employment contracts that are more e¢cient
than is the spot market contract. The infrequent arrival of outside o¤ers can be
exploited by the …rm in its design of an optimal contract. In general, full e¢-
ciency cannot be achieved. We …nd that a constrained e¢cient contract has two
essential characteristics: the …rst is a promise by the …rm to match outside o¤ers
to any worker who has invested e¢ciently; the second is a commitment by the
…rm not to match outside o¤ers of any worker who is revealed to have invested
ine¢ciently. An implication of the …rm’s commitment is that workers who invest
ine¢ciently generate only low outside o¤ers. The …rm’s promise and commitment
provide incentives for the workers to invest e¢ciently.
Our work is related to and complements three literatures. In the …rst of
these, research e¤ort has been devoted to understanding the contracts and incen-
tive schemes that emerge when employees may invest in human capital that is
valuable both to their current employer and to alternative employers. Carmichael
(1983,1988), Malcomson (1984), Waldman (1984,1990), Milgromand Oster(1987),
3Kahn and Huberman (1988), MacLeod and Malcomson (1988), Ricart I Costa
(1988), Gibbons and Katz (1991), Bernhardt and Scoones (1993), and Bernhardt
(1995) explore how employers manipulate personnel systems when the knowledge
they have about their own employees is superior to that of other employers. Our
paper complements this literature by looking at the case in which workers may
promote themselves directly to the market. In addition, in our initial model, we
assume that the knowledge that the incumbent …rm has about its employees is
identical to that of outside …rms. The symmetric information assumption is re-
alistic when, for example, a …rm has many branches1 or when workers are highly
specialized2. We relax the symmetric information assumption in Section 3.2.
Our model is also related to models of multi-tasking and in‡uence activi-
ties (Milgrom and Roberts (1982) and Milgrom (1982), Holmstrom and Milgrom
(1991)). While the basic multi-tasking model ignores the e¤ect of time use on
outside options, we apply the multi-tasking model in an environment in which
time use a¤ects outside options.
Lastly, our model also …ts into the literature in which a forcing contract is
used in a principal-agent problem to obtain a particular e¤ort on the part of the
agent. (For example, see Gale and Hellwig (1985).)
We now provide the details of the basic model.
2. The Model
Workers in a competitive occupation work for two periods and maximize their
expected present value of income. The proportion, ¼h, of the workers have high
ability, µ = h, and the proportion, ¼l, have low ability, µ = l;l < h.
When new workers enter an occupation, their abilities are unknown. At this
stage, the worker and …rm negotiate the terms of the worker’s employment. After
1If a …rm is geographically separated from head o¢ce, local competitors may have as good
an idea of the branch manager’s e¤orts and skills as does head o¢ce.
2If workers are highly specialized, a manager may not be able to evaluate the contribution
of each specialist as well as other specialists in competing …rms.
4the agreement is made, the employee works at the …rm. Workers learn their
ability on the job at the beginning of the …rst period. The employee’s knowledge
is private. Once workers know their ability, they undertake investment in the
…rst period. This investment a¤ects a worker’s productivity in the second period.
Investment may also a¤ect a worker’s visibility in the labour market.
Output in the …rst period, denoted by Z, is independent of a worker’s type and
investment decision. Let the worker have one unit of time in the …rst period to
divide between two investment activities, labelled V and I. (We address the issue
of costly investment in a later section.) Each activity enhances the productivity
of the worker in the second period. Suppose that a worker of type µ invests time
t 2 [0;1] on V and time (1¡t) on I. The value of a worker’s investment in the two
activities is aggregated into the second period’s output, y(t;µ) = Y (V (t;µ);I(1¡
t;µ)). The output, y(t;µ), is assumed to be increasing in µ, concave in t, and single
peaked in t. (If H is a function of several variables we let Hx denote its partial
derivative with respect to x.) The derivative yt(t;µ) is assumed to be increasing
in µ. Note that t and µ are unobserved by employers in the …rst period.
V encompasses activities (like networking) that simultaneously are valued by
the …rm and enhance a worker’s chance of being seen to be valuable. At the
beginning of the second period, a worker’s self promoting investments may result
in the revelation of a worker’s investment and type to the inside …rm and an
outside …rm. When revelation occurs, V (t;µ), I(1¡t;µ) and thus t; µ and y(t;µ),
the second period’s output, are revealed to both the inside …rm and an outside
…rm.
Let p(t;µ) be the probability that a worker who invests t on V is revealed
to the inside and an outside …rm. The probability, p(t;µ), is assumed to be
increasing and concave in its two arguments. The derivative pt(t;µ) is assumed
to be increasing in µ.
We assume that the value of a worker to a …rm depends on the match be-
tween the …rm and worker as well as on y(t;µ), so that there is an idiosyncratic
component to a …rm’s valuation of a worker. A worker, whose output is y(t;µ), is
5valued at y(t;µ) + x by the inside …rm, and is valued at y(t;µ) + z by an outside
…rm, where both x and z are distributed independently and identically on [¡²;²]
according to the distribution F. The density of F is atomless and continuous on
[¡";"] and is symmetric about zero. The mean of F is zero. Di¤erent valua-
tions occur due to idiosyncratic di¤erences across …rms. We refer to x and z as
inside and outside idiosyncratic valuations respectively. We refer to y(t;µ) + x
and y(t;µ) + z as inside and outside valuations respectively.
We compare the spot market outcome with a constrained e¢cient outcome
and a contracting outcome.
2.1. The Constrained E¢cient Allocation of E¤ort
The e¢cient solution maximizes the sum of the second period gains to three
parties: the inside …rm, the worker, and the outside …rm. However, it may be
impossible for the inside …rm and worker to extract all the gains from the outside
…rm. We are interested in the highest expected second period income that a
worker and inside …rm (hereafter referred to as the team) can achieve. Under the
assumption that the valuations are known to both the team and the outside …rm
once an o¤er is made, the …nal matches are e¢cient and the surplus from trade3,
maxfz ¡ x;0g, is split in some way between the raider and the team. The exact
split of the surplus depends on strategic issues that arise between the team and the
outside …rm. In the case that the team never gains any of the surplus from trade
with the outside …rm, the best that the team can obtain, is maxt y(t;µ)+Efxg =
maxt y(t;µ) since Efxg = 0 where E denotestheexpectation operatorwith respect
to F. The surplus becomes available with probability p(t;µ) when the worker
invests t in activity V . In the case that the team gains all of the surplus from
trade with the outside …rm, the best that the worker can obtain is maxt(y(t;µ) +
Efxg+p(t;µ)E maxfz¡x;0g) = maxt(y(t;µ)+p(t;µ)E maxfz¡x;0g). In general,
in the case that the team extracts the fraction s of the maximumsurplus available,
the best that the team can obtain is the maximum, over t 2 [0;1], of
3Trade occurs when the worker leaves the incumbent …rm to work for the raider.
6y(t;µ) + p(t;µ)sE maxfz ¡x;0g
Consequently, the constrained e¢cient investment, Tµ(s), satis…es
(yt(t;µ)) + (pt(t;µ))sE maxfz ¡ x;0g = 0 (2.1)
The derivative of equation 2.1 is used in a straightforward fashion to prove the
following proposition under the assumptions that y and p are concave in t and
that p increases in t.
Proposition 2.1. The constrained e¢cient solution Tµ(s) increases in s.
The intuition is as follows. The more of the surplus over the output that the
team can obtain through an outside o¤er, the more e¤ort the worker exerts on V ,
the self-promoting activity.
Recall that we have assumed that y(t;µ) is concave in t, p(t;µ) increases in t,
and that both pt(t;µ) and yt(t;µ) increase in µ. Thus, the solution to 2.1 increases
in µ, i.e. Th(s) > T l(s), so that the more able worker allocates more e¤ort to the
visible activity than does the less able. One implication is that, at the constrained
e¢cient outcome, the probability that a worker receives an outside o¤er, is higher
if the worker is of type h rather than l, i.e., p(T h(s);h) > p(T l(s);l). Though the
presence of idiosyncratic matching a¤ects the worker’s investment decision so that
Tµ(s) does not maximize output, y(t;µ), we assume that the e¤ect of matching
is not so great as to invert the relationship of the output of workers of di¤ering
ability. Thus, we assume that heterogeneity in general ability is large relative to
that in …rm matches so that the constrained e¢cient output of a worker is higher
if the worker is more able (i.e., y(Th(s);h) > y(Tl(s);l)).
2.2. The Spot Market Solution
In order to characterize the spot market solution we need to analyze the bidding
process that begins once an outside o¤er is made. Assume that a worker is earning
7a wage of w if no outside o¤ers have been made. Once a worker shows an outside
o¤er to the incumbent …rm, a bidding process begins. We model this bidding
process as an ascending bid oral auction with two bidders who have individual
valuations. The equilibrium outcome of such a bidding process is that the worker
goes to the …rm with the higher idiosyncratic valuation and is paid the lower
valuation. In this case, a worker presents only initial o¤ers that are above the
current wage w. In addition, outside …rms that value the worker above w make
an initial o¤er that equals the current wage. Thus, with probability (1 ¡p(t;µ)),
there is no outside bidder and the worker obtains w. With probability p(t;µ),
there is an outside bidder and the worker obtains y(t;µ) + minfx;zg if it exceeds
w.
2.2.1. Spot Market Investment in Activity V
Given the current base wage w, a worker’s income is at least as great as w.
With probability p(t;µ), a worker can augment the base wage by the amount
y(t;µ)+minfx;zg¡w whenever thisamount is positive. Thus, a worker maximizes
expected income by investing, in activity V , time, ¿µ(w) equal to
argmax(w + p(t;µ)E(maxfy(t;µ) + minfx;zg ¡ w;0g)
so that ¿µ(w) satis…es
(pt(t;µ))E(maxfy(t;µ) + minfx;zg ¡ w;0g) + p(t;µ)(ER(µ)yt(t;µ)) = 0 (2.2)
where ER(µ) denotes the expectation operator conditional on the domain R(µ) and
R(µ) denotes the domain over which x;z 2 [¡²;²] satisfy
y(t;µ) + minfx;zg ¡ w > 0
If we let Âµ(t;w) = argr2[¡²;²] min±(y(t;µ) + r;w); where ± is Euclidean distance,
then the domain R(µ) can be written as R(µ) = [Âµ(t;w);²] £ [Âµ(t;w);²].
8Proposition 2.2. The worker in the spot market over-invests in V relative to
the constrained e¢cient solution when the team’s share of the gains to trade is
zero. The size of the over-investment diminishes as the share of the maximum
gains to trade increases.
Proof. Since the left-hand side of equation 2.2 is positive when evaluated at
t = T µ(0) (due to the facts that yt(Tµ(0);µ) = 0, and pt(t;µ) > 0 for all t 2 [0;1]),
it is immediate that the worker over-invests in activity V in the spot market
relative to the constrained e¢cient level Tµ(0) when the team extracts the fraction
0 of the maximum gains to trade with the outside …rm. An appeal to the previous
proposition completes the proof.
2.2.2. Spot Market Base Wage
We …rst …nd the wage in the second period and then work backwards to …nd the
market-clearing wage in the …rst period. All workers who either receive an o¤er
that is less than the base wage, or who do not have the chance to reveal themselves
credibly, receive the base wage. The base wage must equal the expected output of
a randomly chosen worker who receives such a wage. If the base wage is greater
than the expected output, the …rm is losing money on those who receive the base
wage. If it is less, another …rm can o¤er more than the base wage to a worker
who has not been revealed and be assured, on average, of attracting someone of
higher value than their o¤er. The base wage is received by a worker of type µ
who invests ¿µ(w) in V and who either did not receive an o¤er (this happens with
probability (1 ¡ p(¿µ(w);µ)) or who received an o¤er that was below the base




µ2fh;lg¼µy(¿µ(w);µ)[1 ¡ p(¿µ(w);µ) + p(¿µ(w);µ)F(Âµ(¿µ(w);w)]
P
µ2fh;lg¼µ[1 ¡ p(¿µ(w);µ) + p(¿µ(w);µ)F(Âµ(¿µ(w);w)]
so that S(w) is the conditional expected output of a randomly chosen worker who
receives the base wage w. The equilibrium spot market base wage, w0, satis…es
w0 = S(w0). By continuity, there is always a solution to w¡S(w) = 0. Note that
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l(w0);l) < w0 < y(¿
h(w0);h) (2.3)
Now, we determine the …rst period wage. The …rm makes zero expected pro…ts
on workers who receive w0. However, the …rm makes positive pro…t on those
workers who receive an outside o¤erfroman outside …rmwhose valuation is higher
than w0 and whose idiosyncratic valuation z is less than the inside idiosyncratic
valuation x. In order to clear the market4 for employment in the …rst period,












2.3. Constrained E¢cient Contract
We now consider long-term, constrained-e¢cient contracts in which workers can
post a bond in the …rst period. If pro…ts in the second period are expected to be
negative, workers can choose to post a bond, B, in the …rst period, that is earn
Z ¡B, in order to render the constrained e¢cient contract attractive to the …rm.
If there is no bound to the bond that workers can pay in the …rst period, there
are many contracts that are constrained e¢cient. For example, suppose that the
…rm guarantees the highest potential wage that any worker may receive, to all
workers in the second period. All workers are then indi¤erent among their choices
of t 2 [0;1]. It is then optimal for workers of type µ to choose the constrained
e¢cient amount of investment. However, such a contract may not achieve the
constrained e¢cient outcome when e¤ort is costly.
In addition, under such a contract, the …rm loses money on every worker in the
second period. The bond that workers must pay in the …rst period to sustain this
contract may be substantial. If workers have limited access to capital markets,
this contract may not be feasible. We now …nd the minimumbond associated with
4We note that the raider also makes positive pro…ts on those workers whose idiosyncratic
valuations are z > x. We assume that search costs dissipate the pro…ts.
5We set the interest rate to zero for convenience.
10a contract that achieves constrained e¢ciency. Conceptually, it is easier to look
at the problem under the assumption that the …rm buys the services of the worker
and then sells the services of the worker to a raider whenever there are gains to
trade. The class of contracts that we consider stipulates payment to the worker
as a function of the information that the …rm has about the worker. Either the
worker has an o¤er, in which case the …rm knows z;x;µ, and the investment level;
or, the worker has no o¤er. Thus, a contract needs to stipulate what the worker
receives in each case.
Let < be the set of real numbers. We consider the set of contracts - =
f(w;Ch(z;x);Cl(z;x)) : w 2 [0;1);Cµ(z;x) 2 <;µ 2 fh;lgg. The interpretation
of a contract in - is as follows. The employer o¤ers to pay (1) w to all who either
do not reveal themselves or reveal themselves to be of type µ with investment
t 6= T µ(s), (2) w + Cµ(z;x) to all who reveal themselves to be of type µ with
output y(Tµ(s);µ) and idiosyncratic valuations (z;x). Note that, by the terms of
any contract in -, a worker can earn at least w by never revealing an outside o¤er,
so that consistency requires w + Cµ(z;x) ¸ w for µ 2 fh;lg. Thus, the relevant
set of contracts is -+ = f(w;Ch(z;x);Cl(z;x)) : w;Ch(z;x);Cl(z;x) 2 [0;1)g.
We can interpret w to be a base wage; Cµ(z;x), a countero¤er (over and above
the base wage) for µ 2 fh;lg; and yµ(Tµ(s);µ), a target for µ 2 fh;lg that dictates
who receives the countero¤er among those who receive an outside o¤er.
Each contract in -+ is associated with a bond payment in the initial period.
We look for the contract that minimizes the bond payment among incentive com-
patible, individually rational, constrained e¢cient contracts in -+.
In order that a contract in -+ elicit the constrained e¢cient outcome, three
sets of individual rationality constraints must be satis…ed. Firstly, workers must
want to invest in the constrained e¢cient level of each activity. Secondly, workers
who invest constrained e¢ciently must want to accept the payments from the …rm
rather than negotiate separately with a raider. Thirdly, workers must be sorted
e¢ciently among …rms.
The …rst individual rationality constraint requires that workers choose the con-
11strained e¢cient level of investment in V . A worker who makes the constrained
e¢cient investment earns at least w under a contract in -+ since the countero¤er
Cµ(z;x) ¸ 0;µ 2 fh;lg. A worker who invests ine¢ciently makes at most w since
a raider need not o¤er more than w to a worker who receives no countero¤ers.
Thus, a worker prefers to make the constrained e¢cient investment when facing
a contract in -+.
The second individual rationality constraint requires that workers have no in-
centive to negotiate separately with the outside …rm when the opportunity arises.
For µ 2 fh;lg, let pµ denote p(Tµ(s);µ), the probability that an o¤er is received
given that a worker has chosen the constrained e¢cient investment, and let yµ
denote y(T µ(s);µ), the output given the constrained e¢cient investment. Under
a contract in -+, the worker is paid w+Cµ(z;x) whenever the worker is revealed
to have produced yµ. In the event that z > x, the outside …rm obtains the worker
and pays yµ + x + s(z ¡ x) to the inside …rm. If instead, z < x, the worker
remains with the inside …rm and the outside …rm is willing to pay yµ+z to obtain
the worker. Now recall that the worker can always earn w by not revealing the
existence of an outside o¤er. Consequently, the required individually rational
constraint is that w + Cµ(z;x) ¸ maxfw;yµ + minfz;xg + smaxfz ¡ x;0gg.
The last individually rational constraint requires that workers who make the
constrained e¢cient investment are sorted e¢ciently. Recall that when a worker
is revealed with idiosyncratic valuations z > x, the worker is valued more highly
by the raider than by the inside …rm; when z < x, the worker is less highly valued
by the raider. When a worker of type µ is revealed to have invested Tµ(s) and
z > x, a contract in -+ that achieves e¢cient sorting must stipulate that the
worker leaves; when z < x, the contract must stipulate that the worker stays.
Any worker who does not obtain an o¤er remains at the …rm. Therefore, a
contract in -+ achieves e¢cient sorting conditional on the worker having made
the constrained e¢cient investment provided that it stipulates that the worker
leave when it is e¢cient to do so.
If the base wage is to be e¤ective, the base wage must be greater than or
12equal to the expected output of those who receive it. Otherwise, an outside
…rm can o¤er more than the base wage to a random worker who receives it and
expect to earn a pro…t. Let EC(w) represent the conditional expected output of
those who receive the base wage, w, and stay at the …rm when the constrained
e¢cient outcome is achieved using a contract (w;Ch;Cl) 2 -+. Thus, EC(w)
is the expected output of workers of type µ 2 fh;lg who either do not receive
a …nal o¤er or who are revealed with idiosyncratic valuations z < x, such that
Cµ(z;x) = 0. Let GC(w) be the probability, conditional on revelation, that a





µ2fh;lgyµ¼µ[1 ¡ pµ + pµGC(w)]
P
µ2fh;lg¼µ[1 ¡pµ + pµGC(w)]
It remains for us to discuss the bond associated with a constrained e¢cient
contract in -+. For any contract in -+, the bond posted by a worker in the
…rst period equals the expected loss of the …rm in the second period. The bond
equals the di¤erence between the …rm’s expected expenditure and its expected
revenue. The …rm’s expected expenditure is the payment to the worker. The
…rm’s expected revenue is the expected revenue from the worker’s services. This
revenue consists of internal production plus the sale of the worker’s services to a
raider whenever it is pro…table to do so.























subject to the base wage constraint
w ¸ E
C(w)
13and the individual rationality constraints
w + C
µ(z;x) ¸ maxfw;y
µ + minfz;xg + smaxfz ¡ x;0gg;µ 2 fh;lg
For µ 2 fh;lg, let Cµ¤(z;x;w) = maxfw;yµ+minfz;xg+smaxfz¡x;0gg¡w.
Note that Cµ¤ decreases in w until w = yµ + minfz;xg + smaxfz ¡ x;0g.
Proposition 2.3. The solution to problem 1 is
w














µ2fh;lg¼µ[1 ¡ pµ + pµ(
1
2)FÂµ(T µ(s);w))]
Proof. We cannot use the Kuhn-Tucker conditions to …nd a solution for problem
1 as we have a continuum of constraints. However, since the objective function is
linear and increasing in its choice variables we can provide a direct proof. Note




µ + minfz;xg + smaxfz ¡ x;0gg ¡ w
forany µ 2 fh;lg can be optimal sincethe feasible triple(w;Ch¤(z;x;w);Cl¤(z;x;w))
is associated with a lower bond than is (w;Ch(z;x);Cl(z;x)). This is immediate
since the bond increases in Cµ(z;x), for µ 2 fh;lg.
We now argue that no feasible triple (w;Ch¤(z;x;w);Cl¤(z;x;w)) such that










is associated with a lower bond. To see this, …rst note that C
µ¤
w (z;x;w) =
¡1 for w · yµ + minfz;xg + smaxfz ¡ x;0g for µ 2 fh;lg. This implies
14that B(w;Cµ¤(z;x;w)) is increasing in w. Next, note that when Cµ(z;x) =
Cµ¤(z;x;w), GC¤(w) is the probability that yµ + z · w and z < x conditional on
revelation. We can calculate the conditional probability as follows. Conditional
on revelation, the probability that the idiosyncratic valuation of the raider is less
than that of the inside …rm, equals
1
2. To complete the calculation, we need to
know the conditional probability that the outside valuation is less than the base
wage. Recall that Âµ(t;w) = argr2[¡²;²] min±(y(t;µ) + r;w); where ± is Euclidean
distance. It follows that GC¤(w) = 1








µ2fh;lgyµ¼µ[1 ¡ pµ + pµ(1
2)FÂµ(Tµ(s);w))]
P
µ2fh;lg¼µ[1 ¡ pµ + pµ(
1
2)FÂµ(T µ(s);w))]
so that EC¤ increases in w, since yh > yl;ph > pl; and6 F is increasing in w.
Kuhn-Tucker conditions show that the solution to the problem of minimizing





Existence of a base wage that solves equation 2.4 is obtained as follows. The
right-hand side of equation 2.4 is larger than the left-hand side when w = 0; the
right-hand side is smaller when w > yh + yl. There may be multiple solutions to
equation 2.4. The fact that B(w;Ch¤(z;x;w);Cl¤(z;x;w)) increases in w implies
that the base wage in the solution to problem 1 is the smallest solution to equation
2.4. That is, w = w¤. Thus, the feasible triple (w¤;Ch¤(z;x;w¤);Cl¤(z;x;w¤))
is the solution to problem 1.
The interpretation of the bond minimizing contract is as follows.
(i) All workers are guaranteed a based wage of w¤.
(ii) If z > x the outside …rm pays the worker yµ +x+s(z ¡x) and the worker
leaves to work for the outside …rm. If yµ+x+s(z¡x) · w¤, the inside …rm pays a
6Recall that the implications that ph > pl and yh > yl follow from the assumptions that
Th(s) > Tl(s), that p(t;µ) increases in t and µ and that the partial derivative of y(t;µ) and
p(t;µ) with respect to t increases in µ.
15severance of w¤¡(yµ+x+s(z¡x)) when the worker leaves and so the inside …rm
makes negative pro…ts in the second period in this case. If yµ+x+s(z¡x) > w¤,
the inside …rm pays zero and breaks even.
(iii) If x > z, and yµ + z > w¤, the worker stays at the inside …rm and earns
yµ + z. The …rm earns positive pro…ts on these workers in the second period.
(iv) If x > z, and yµ + z · w or if the worker receives no o¤ers, the worker
stays at the inside …rm and earns w¤. The …rm breaks even in expected value
terms in this case.
The bond paid by the worker in the …rst period may be negative. The inside
…rm collects a positive bond to pay severance in case (ii) and it collects a negative
bond in case (iii).
Under the bond minimizing contract, the average earnings of workers who
leave are higher than that of those who stay when earnings include both severance
payments and the wages paid by the outside …rm. The argument is as follows.
As z and x are drawn independently according to F, the probability that z > x
is equal to the probability that x > z. Thus, the probability that a worker leaves
equals the probability that a worker stays given that the worker has received an
outside o¤er. The probability that yµ + x + s(z ¡ x) > w given z > x is greater
than the probability that yµ + z > w given x > z. That is, conditional on
a worker receiving outside o¤er, the probability that a worker who leaves earns
more than w is greater than the probability that a worker who stays earns more
than w. In addition, the expected value of yµ + x + s(z ¡ x) (given both z > x
and yµ +z +s(z ¡x) > w) is larger than the expected value of yµ +x (given both
x > z and yµ + x > w). That is, conditional on receiving an o¤er, the average
earnings of workers who leave and earn more than w, are greater than those of
workers who stay and earn more than w. Since a worker always earns at least
w if we include severance payments as part of the earnings, we conclude that the
unconditional average earnings of those who leave are higher than of those who
stay.
If we compare wages and exclude severance payments then we …nd that the
16average wages of workers who leave may be greater or lesser than of those who
stay7.
One incentive in the minimum bond contract is provided by the threat of the
incumbent …rm to pay w¤ to any worker who is revealed to have invested inef-
…ciently. In our model a worker’s productivity is revealed to a single outside
…rm and the inside …rm. The implication of the incumbent …rm’s threat in this
context is that a sole outside …rm who knows the worker’s type and investment
level need not o¤er more than w¤ to such a worker. Thus the incumbent …rm
exploits the scarcity of knowledgable outside …rms in the optimal contract. The
assumption that knowledgable outside …rms are scarce is reasonable when infor-
mation is costly and workers have to invest in self-promoting activities to attract
outside o¤ers. Another incentive in the contract is provided by the promise of the
…rm to match outside o¤ers. Note that the ability to commit is necessary for the
contract to work. In the context of a repeated game, commitment can be enforced
by reputation arguments. In the absence of commitment, as in the spot market
case, the incumbent …rm bids for the worker’s services whenever it is pro…table
to do so.
3. Variations of the Model
In this section we consider two variations of the model. In one variation, in-
vestment is costly. In another variation, we suppose that the inside …rm has an
informational advantage over the outside …rm vis à vis the productivity of the
worker. The basic insights remain. The role of a specialized activity such as V
is to allow more able individuals to separate themselves from the less abled. The
7 This is due to the fact that while the wage of a worker who stays is greater than or
equal to w, the wage of one who leaves may be less than w. The wage is less than w when
yµ + x + s(z ¡ x) < w and z > x. In this case, conditional on receiving an o¤er, the average
wages of workers who leave may be more or less than those of workers who stay. Thus, the
unconditional average wages of workers who leave may be more or less than those of workers
who stay. Workers who leave earn more than those who stay if, for example, the proportion of
highly skilled workers is relatively high and the variance of F is low.
17spot market provides private incentives for more able individuals to over-invest
in the specialized activity relative to the e¢cient investment. In order to achieve
e¢cient investment in such an activity, the …rm promises a countero¤er in the
event that a worker is shown to have invested e¢ciently.
3.1. Costly Investment
Our basic model focuses on the allocation of one unit of time to two activities.
It ignores the cost of time spent in either activity. In particular, it ignores the
problem of shirking on the part of the workers. Let’s now consider a version of
our model in which we assume that individuals face a disutility of e¤ort exerted.
Suppose that " = 0 and that s = 0 in the model so that the e¢cient investment
is the one that maximizes y(t;µ). We now o¤er a way of incorporating a cost of
investment in the model.
Workers initially choose between e¤ort and leisure and then choose how to
allocate the e¤ort between activities V and I. Suppose that an individual of type
µ who exerts e¤ort ¸ faces the cost ·(¸;µ). Further assume that an individual of
type µ who exerts e¤ort ¸ and invests time t in activity V produces ¸y(t;µ). We
have normalized total investment so that an employee who works 0 of the time
is doing the minimum necessary to stay on the job. The worker’s maximization
problem is analogous to that which elicits the e¢cient outcome in the basic model.
The e¢cient outcome is one in which the worker maximizes ¸y(t;µ)¡·(¸;µ), over
¸ 2 [0;1];t 2 [0;1],
The solution is that the e¢cient investment decision (T ¤(µ)) is as in the basic
model while the e¢cient labour decision (¸
¤(µ)) sets y(t;µ) equal to the marginal
cost of investment.
Now consider the spot market solution. Assume that an individual of type µ
who exerts e¤ort ¸ and whoinvests time t in activity V isrevealed with probability
P(¸;t;µ) where P increases in each of its variables. The worker’s spot market
maximization problem is analogous to that in the basic model. When the base
wage is w, an individual of type µ maximizes w+P(¸;t;µ)(¸y(t;µ)¡w)¡·(¸;µ),
18over ¸ 2 [0;1];t 2 [0;1], at ^ ¿(µ;w), ^ ¸(µ:w).
It is immediate that ^ ¿(µ;w) > T¤(µ) whenever ^ ¸(µ;w)y(^ ¿(µ;w);µ) > w. Thus,
any individual who chooses to work over-invests in activity V relative to the
e¢cient level.
Now let’s consider the question of shirking in the spot market. Shirking was
not an available option in the basic model. As in the basic model, the spot market
base wage equals the expected output of those who receive it. It is immediate
that it cannot be the case that both types exert zero e¤ort and thereby produce
zero output. (Recall that the units are normalized so that zero output is just
enough to stay employed.) If so, then the base wage equals zero. The best
response of the high ability worker is to exert positive e¤ort when facing a zero
base wage. However, in this case, the base wage of zero no longer equals the
expected output of those who receive it. Thus, it must be the case that the high
ability worker exerts positive e¤ort. In equilibrium, the less able worker may
exert zero e¤ort, positive e¤ort, or each with some probability. Each of these
cases is associated with an expected output of those who receive the base wage.
An equilibrium exists if the solution to the equation (that equates the base wage
with the expected output) elicits the e¤ort associated with the equation. As the
parameters vary, the equation (equating the base wage with the expected output)
whose solution elicits the associated e¤ort varies. We …nd that some low types
always exerts zero e¤ort in equilibrium. The remaining low types exert zero or
positive e¤ort, depending on the costs and bene…ts of doing so8.
Lastly, we discuss the minimum bond that allows the …rm to achieve the
e¢cient outcome subject to the wage being greater than the expected output
of those who receive it and subject to individual rationality constraints. Here
the results are analogous to those in Section 5. The minimum bond is achieved
when the base wage equals the expected output of those who receive it and the
countero¤ers make the workers indi¤erent between pursuing the e¢cient outcome
and negotiating directly with the outside …rms. A notable di¤erence is that, since
8See the Appendix for the details.
19low ability workers exert costly e¤ort, even those of low valuation need to be paid
a countero¤er when they are revealed to have exerted the e¢cient labour and
investment choices. The reason is that the base wage is a weighted sum of the two
outputs. In this case the output of the less abled worker who exerts the e¢cient
amount of e¤ort is less than the base wage. When the countero¤er is zero, the
less abled receive only the base wage and this is independent of their investment
levels. But then the less abled have an incentive to exert zero e¤ort unless there
is some reward for exerting costly e¤ort.
3.2. Matching with Asymmetric Information about Worker Ability
We now consider altering the informational assumptions regarding the ability and
investment of the worker. In the basic model, the inside …rm has no informational
advantage over the outside …rm regarding the worker’s type and investment. With
probability p(t;µ), the worker’s type and investment is made known to the inside
and outside …rms simultaneously. We now make the alternative polar assumption
that the inside …rm knows a worker’s type and investment as soon as the worker
knows. Thus, it isthe outside …rmwhoisalerted to aworker’stype and investment
level with probability p(t;µ).
When bonds are available and long-term contracts can be written, the worker
and …rm can agree that the …rm pays each worker according to output. In this
case, each worker chooses investments so as to maximize output.
It is the spot market outcome that is interesting in this case. When long-term
contracts are not available, the …rm cannot commit to pay each worker according
to output. The …rm pays the wage that maximizes current pro…ts. It pays a
base wage to all workers who are unable to reveal themselves. The base wage
is greater than or equal to the output of the low ability worker. Otherwise a
raider can pro…tably hire away such workers at a wage equal to this low output.
However, the base wage may be below the expected output of those who receive
it. The reason is that, as in Greenwald (1986), if a raider randomly attempts to
hire a worker of unknown quality, the inside …rm can respond by matching the
20wage o¤er whenever the worker is of high ability. Thus, a raider only wins those
workers of low ability. In this case, a raider o¤ers a low wage to those of unknown
quality even when the wage o¤ered by the inside …rm is below the average output
of workers who receive the base wage. So, what is the base wage that the inside
…rm pays in this case? Let " = 0 so that s = 0 in the basic model. In this case,
there are no idiosyncratic valuations. Since the base wage is at least as great
as the output of the low ability worker, a worker who is identi…ed as low ability
by an outside …rm never receives an o¤er that is higher than the base wage. In
this case, the worker is indi¤erent among investment levels when facing a given
base wage. In this case, the base wage must be at least as great as the e¢cient
output of the low ability worker. Let yl represent the e¢cient level of output of
the low ability worker. Let y(t) represent the output of the high ability worker.
Let p(t) represent the probability that a worker of high ability obtains an outside
o¤er when the worker invests the amount t. For any given base wage w ¸ yl a
worker of high ability chooses ¿(w) to maximize p(t)y(t) + (1 ¡ p(t))w. Since a
high ability worker receives y(¿(w)) with probability p(¿(w)), the incumbent …rm
makes positive pro…t on high ability workers only with probability (1¡p(¿(w))).
The …rm’s pro…t function is
Q
(w) = ¼(y(¿(w))¡w)(1¡p(¿(w))+(1¡¼)(yl¡w).
(If H is a function of one variable, x, we let H0(x) denote the derivative of H with
respect to x). The derivative ¦0(w) = ¼(y0(¿(w))¿0(w) ¡(1 ¡p(¿(w))) ¡(1 ¡¼).
We can …nd examples in which the …rm should set the base wage equal to yl,
the minimum feasible base wage. We can also …nd examples in which the …rm
should set the base wage above the expected output of those who receive it9.
This contrasts with the results of Greenwald (1986). Greenwald assumes that
the market’s wage o¤er to a worker the …rm does not lay o¤ equals the worker’s
expected ability conditional on the worker choosing to accept the market’s o¤er
rather than the …rm’s. In the terminology of auction theory, Greenwald allows
for the winner’s curse. If only the lesser abled can be hired away then the wage
is driven down to the output of the less abled. In our setting, the base wage has
9See the Appendix for the details.
21two roles to play. It a¤ects not only the probability that a signal is sent but also
a¤ects the output that a worker produces. The higher the wage, the higher the
output produced and the lower the probability that an o¤er is received. Thus,
although the winner’s curse is present, it does not drive the basewage down to the
output of the low ability worker.
4. Conclusion
Our model explains why it is rational for the …rm to respond strategically to
outside o¤ers in the presence of self-promoting activities. It is also rational for
the employee to seek outside o¤ers. In the presence of costly investment the
absence of outside o¤ers leads to ine¢ciencies in both matches and human capital
investment. We conclude by o¤ering an application of the results to academia.
University administrators usually know less about a professor’s productivity
than do a professor’s peers.10 Even when a particular department may be in-
formed of a professor’s productivity, it may not be prudent for the university
administration to rely on a department’s internal evaluation. Frequently, pro-
fessors at other universities have a more accurate perception of an individual’s
performance relative to that of a professor’s departmental colleagues. Thus, the
polar assumption of no insider informational advantage in the basic model is not
unreasonable in academia.
Academic research corresponds to the self-promoting investment in the model.
Research increases both the productivity and visibility of the professor. Teaching
and administrative activities corresponds to the non-visible activity of the model.
Due to the lack of information about how to evaluate the productivity of their
professors, universities pay most of their professors relatively uniform salaries.
Consistent with the model, professors, in some disciplines, spend a lot of e¤ort
trying to generate outside o¤ers. When a professor receives an outside o¤er,
the university begins to renegotiate the professor’s salary. Whether the raider
10The problems which academic employers face are discussed more broadly in Siow (1996).
22succeeds in attracting the professor or not, the professor ends up with a higher
salary.
The process of raising salaries on the evidence of an outside o¤er can explain
the …nding of a negative seniority wage premium in academia11 (Ransom (1993),
Hallock(1994), Moore et. al. (1994)). These authors …nd that in cross section
data, controlling for years of experience but without controlling for productivity,
professors with less seniority in a university earn higher wages. This …nding
contrasts with the positive seniority wage premium found in the general working
population (e.g. Altonji and Shakoto (1987), Topel (1991)).
In general, the base wage in the minimum bond contract is di¤erent from the
wage in the spot market. This base wage is an element of academic tenure in that
tenure enables a university to guarantee a minimum wage for professors12. The
most common criticism of academic tenure is that it encourages tenured professors
to shirk. (See e.g. Alchian (1959).) Our model suggests that this argument is
incomplete. As discussed in ourextension, shirkingcan be deterred, even when the
university o¤ers a minimum wage to its employees, so long as universities respond
optimally to outside o¤ers received by their tenured professors. Our model does
highlight the importance that a university’s response to outside o¤ers has in the
deterrence of shirking.
Appendix
In this appendix, we …rst provide some of the details of the equilibrium spot
market wage in the variation of the basic model in which investment is costly. We
then provide an example of the variation of the basic model in which informational
asymmetries exist and the incumbent …rms cannot exploit the winners’ curse fully.
A. Costly Investment
As in the basic model, the equilibrium spot market wage equals the expected out-
put of those who receive the base wage. When investment is costly, the expected
11In our model, a negative seniority wage premium obtains if, for example, the proportion of
highly skilled workers is relatively high and the variance of F is low.
12Models of tenure include those of Chen and Ferris (1995), Carmichael (1988), Freeman
(1977), and McPherson and Winston (1983). See Siow (1996).
23output of those who receive the base wage depends on the investments made by
the workers in the spot market equilibrium. The equation for the expected out-
put depends on whether the less able workers produce zero or positive e¤ort in
equilibrium. The parameters determine the equilibrium spot market wage as fol-
lows. Recall that the pair (^ ¿(µ;w); ^ ¸(h;w)) is the optimal response of a worker
of type µ to a spot market wage of w. Let ^ P(w;µ) = P(^ ¸(µ;w);^ ¿(µ;w);µ) be the
probability that a worker of type µ (who exerts e¤ort ^ ¸(µ;w) and devotes time
^ ¿(µ;w) to V ) is revealed. The right-hand side of
w =
¼h^ ¸(h;w)y(^ ¿(h;w);h)(1 ¡ ^ P(w;h))
¼h^ ¸(h;w)(1 ¡ ^ P(w;h)) + ¼l (A.1)
is the expected output when the more able worker produces positive output and
the less able produces zero output. Let ~ w be the solution to equation A.1. In the
case that
P(¸;t;l)(¸y(t;l) ¡ ~ w) < ·(¸;l)
for ¸ 2 (0;1];t 2 [0;1], the less able worker …nds it too costly to exert e¤ort when
facing ~ w. In this case, the spot market base wage is ~ w and those of type l exert
zero e¤ort and so exert less than the e¢cient amount of e¤ort. Those of type h
may over- or under-exert relative to the e¢cient amount.
In the case that
^ P( ~ w;l)(^ ¸(l; ~ w)y(^ ¿(l; ~ w);l) ¡ ~ w) > ·(^ ¸(l; ~ w);l)
~ w cannot be the spot market wage. The reason is due to the following contradic-
tion. In this case, ~ w equals an expected output that is based on the assumption
that the less able worker exerts zero e¤ort but the less able worker has an incentive
to provide e¤ort when facing ~ w. We thus look for a solution in which the fraction
q of the less able workers exerts e¤ort and the fraction 1 ¡ q exerts zero e¤ort.
Since some of the less able workers exert positive e¤ort and some exert zero e¤ort,
it must be the case the less able worker is indi¤erent between these two options.
In this case, we look for a solution, in w and q, to the simultaneous equations
w =
¼h^ ¸(h;w)y(^ ¿(h;w);h)(1 ¡ ^ P(w;h) + ¼l^ ¸(l;w)y(^ ¿(l;w);l)(1 ¡ ^ P(w;l)q
¼h(1 ¡ ^ P(w;h) + ¼l[1 ¡q + (1 ¡ ^ P(w;l))q]
(A.2)
and
^ P(w;l)(^ ¸(l;w)y(^ ¿(l;w);l) ¡ w) = ·(^ ¸(l;w);l) (A.3)
When q = 0, w = ~ w solves equation A.2, (i.e. the solution to A.1 solves A.2
when q = 0), and the value of the left-hand side of A.3 is greater than that of the
right. When q = 1, say that the solution to A.2 is ¸ w. It is clear that the left-hand
24side of A.3 is smaller than the right-hand side when the wage is ¸ w. (The reason
is that when q = 1, ¸ w is a linear combination of y(^ ¿(h; ¸ w);h) and y(^ ¿(l; ¸ w);l).
Thus, ¸ w > y(^ ¿(l; ¸ w);l).) Continuity then guarantees the existence of simultaneous
solutions to equations A.2 and A.3. Let w; ¹ q be the solution to the simultaneous
equations A.2 and A.3 in this case. When such a solution, w;q, exists then those
of type l are indi¤erent between working ^ ¸(l;w) of the time and not working at
all. In this case, we assume that the proportion q of those of type l work ^ ¸(l;w)
of the time while the proportion 1 ¡ q exert minimal e¤ort.
We note that it is always the case that some low types exert zero e¤ort in
equilibrium. If all low types and high types exerted positive e¤ort then the wage
would be so high that it would be in the interest of the low types to exert no
e¤ort.
B. Informational Asymmetries and the Winner’s Curse
We now provide an example of the variation of the basic model in which infor-
mational asymmetries exist and the incumbent …rms cannot exploit the winners’
curse fully.





1 if 0 < w < 1
(3 ¡w)=2 if 1 < w < 3










0 if 0 < w < 1
1=2 if 1 < w < 3








1 if 0 < w < 1
(5 ¡ w)=4 if 1 < w < 3








0 if 0 < w < 1
(w ¡ 1)=4 if 1 < w < 3




Thus, using the derivative of the pro…t function derived in Section 3.2 of the






¼ ¡ 1 if 0 < w < 1
(¼(7 ¡w)=4) ¡ 1 if 1 < w < 3






yl if ¼ < 2=3
7 ¡ 4=¼ if ¼ > 2=3
)
where ¦ denotes the …rm’s pro…t and W(¼) is the pro…t-maximizing base wage
set by the inside …rm. Note that if ¼ < 2=3;¦0(w) < 0 so that ¦ is maximized
at w = yl if ¼ < 2=3. However, if ¼ > 2=3, then ¦ …rst decreases then increases
then decreases. Thus, the maximizer of ¦, in this case, is at w = 7 ¡ 4=¼ since
the value of ¦ is higher here than at w = 0.
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